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Summary
The anthrax attacks in 2001, along with the events of September 11, have
heightened concern about the nation’s ability to respond to bioterrorist attacks.  The
role of public health in bioterrorism preparedness and response is to plan and
coordinate emergency medical and public health response capabilities, to detect,
investigate and identify disease outbreaks using surveillance systems, epidemiology
and laboratory services,  to maintain healthy conditions by regulating environmental
conditions, food and water safety to minimize disease threats, and to communicate
rapidly and clearly with response partners, health practitioners, the media and the
public.  The capacity to fulfill these responsibilities depends on the strength of the
infrastructure that supports the provision of public health services.
The public health infrastructure is the organizations,  people and data systems
needed to assure the provision of essential public health services.  Public health
organizations exist at the federal, state and local level and interact with each other,
the health care delivery system, public safety providers, private enterprises and
volunteer organizations to provide public health services.  Even before September 11
and the 2001 anthrax attacks, a consensus had emerged among public health experts
that the public health system had deteriorated.  A series of studies and reports cited
outmoded technology and information systems, insufficient resources to combat
emerging and drug-resistant diseases, a  public health workforce with inadequate
training to address new threats or to adapt to new ways of doing things, poor
communication among responsible parties, and inadequate capacity in hospitals and
laboratories to respond to a mass casualty event as the major challenges facing public
health organizations.
Recent congressional action has provided funding and guidance to improve
public health capacity at the federal, state and local level. Challenges remain in a
variety of areas, including:  coordination and communication between public health
officials and other participants in public health preparedness and response, upgrading
data and information systems capabilities, improving laboratory capacity, increasing
emergency medical response capacity, improving the skills and education of the
public health workforce, and conducting research to improve bioterrorism prevention,
detection and treatment options.  Finally, many worry about how to be sure that the
increased funding devoted to increasing public health capacity yields results in
improved preparedness and response capability.  This report will be updated as the
public health system evolves and responds to congressional action.
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An Overview of the U.S. Public Health
System in the Context of Bioterrorism
Introduction
Bioterrorism poses a unique challenge  to the medical care and public health
systems.  Unlike an explosion or chemical attack, which results in immediate and
visible casualties, the public health impact of a biological attack can unfold gradually
over time.  Until a sufficient number of people arrive at emergency rooms and
doctors’ offices complaining of similar symptoms, there may be no sign that an attack
has taken place.  The speed and accuracy with which doctors and laboratories reach
the correct diagnoses and report their findings to public health authorities has a direct
impact on the number of people who become ill and the number that die.  The
Nation’s ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack, therefore, depends crucially on the
state of preparedness of its medical care systems and public health infrastructure.
The public health system plays a central role in orchestrating and coordinating
the response to a bioterrorist attack. The anthrax incidents in 2001 focused
lawmakers’ attention on the U.S. public health system.  Lawmakers, along with the
rest of the public, turned to public health officials for information about the
symptoms of anthrax, the population at risk of exposure, the availability of
preventive measures, and appropriate medical treatment.  In addition, public health
laboratories all over the country tested an unprecedented number of samples of
suspected anthrax.
In general, reviews of the response of public health during the anthrax crisis
have been mixed.  However, it was actually a rather small scale incident and experts
worry that had more people or more localities been affected, the public health system
would have been overwhelmed.  In addition, the anthrax incidents served to highlight
potential problems that public health officials have worried about in recent years.1
Several reports and evaluations described problems with the public health
system prior to the anthrax attacks.  Among the problems cited were health
department closures, outmoded technology and information systems, a  public health
workforce with inadequate training to address new threats or to adapt to new ways
of doing things, poor communication among responsible parties, and inadequate
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capacity in hospitals and laboratories to respond to a mass casualty event.2  The
anthrax attacks demonstrated the seriousness of these problems. 
Among the explanations given for the deficiencies of the public health system
are diffusion of responsibility for public health services across multiple government
agencies and declining funding for their activities, the reduction in risk of infectious
disease through imposition of sound sanitation practices and the development of
vaccines in the early twentieth century, the rising importance of effective biomedical
interventions to combat disease, and a shift in funding priorities to programs
providing medical care to those with no other source of care.3
Improving public health preparedness and response capacity is expected to offer
protection not only from bioterrorist attacks, but also from naturally occurring public
health emergencies.  Public health officials are increasingly concerned about our
exposure and susceptibility to infectious disease and food-borne illness because of
global travel, increased volume of food imports, and the evolution of antibiotic-
resistant pathogens. Public health experts argue that a strong infrastructure provides
the capacity to prepare for and respond to both acute and chronic threats to the
Nation’s health, whether they are bioterrorism attacks, emerging infections,
disparities in health status, or increases in chronic disease and injury rates.
Primary responsibility for public health rests with the states.  However, the
federal government plays an active role in public health by providing funding to
states and localities, establishing national priorities, providing technical assistance,
and coordinating knowledge dissemination.4  Some have suggested that the threat of
bioterrorism has made public health a national security issue and that the federal
government should therefore play a stronger role.  Others worry that a stronger
federal role will reduce flexibility.  They emphasize that events happen in localities,
that localities have differing needs, and that they must have a strong role in resource
allocation decisions.
While many in the public health community have welcomed the renewed
interest in building a strong public health infrastructure, others worry that the
emphasis placed on bioterrorism preparedness provides too narrow a focus to achieve
a truly effective public health system that is responsive to all potential health hazards.
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In addition, the ability to sustain a newly improved infrastructure over time is of
concern to many.
As Congress continues to deliberate on how best to prepare for a bioterrorist
attack, information about the role of public health and the public health infrastructure
becomes increasingly relevant.  This report continues with two sections.  The first
provides an overview of the public health infrastructure.  The second discusses the
changes and improvement that are underway, and the issues and challenges inherent
in improving public health preparedness.
Public Health Infrastructure
The mission of public health, as defined by the Public Health Functions Steering
Committee,  is to promote physical and mental health and prevent disease, injury and
disability.5  The public health system includes a wide array of governmental and non-
governmental entities including: 
! over 3000 county and city health departments and local boards of
health,
! 59 State and territorial health departments,
! tribal health departments,
! more than 160,000 public and private laboratories,6
! parts of multiple Federal departments and agencies,
! hospitals and  other health care providers, and
! volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross. 
Definitions vary but, in practical terms, the public health infrastructure is
federal, state and local public health organizations and the resources they need  to
operate effectively.7    These governmental organizations form “the nerve center of
the public health system”and interact with a wide array of other partners to assure
public health.8  The public health workforce and data and information systems are
key resources.  Of course, funding is also necessary to provide resources.  
In the context of bioterrorism, some key functions of the public health
infrastructure include using disease surveillance systems to detect outbreaks,
conducting specialized laboratory tests to identify bioagents, using epidemiological
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methods to identify persons at risk, and using knowledge of disease processes in
populations to determine appropriate responses (e.g. need for quarantine or
decontamination, dissemination of medical treatment recommendations), and
coordinating with other emergency response partners to establish effective response
plans. 
Legal Framework for Public Health  
The federal government exerts a strong influence on public health practice
through its ability to tax and spend and its responsibility for regulating interstate
commerce.  Through its power to regulate interstate commerce, the federal
government can act to protect the environment, ensure food and drug safety, and
promote occupational health and safety.  The power to tax allows the federal
government to encourage certain behaviors (e.g. deductibility of employee health
insurance costs encourages employers to provide insurance) and to discourage others
(e.g. raising the price of smoking through cigarette taxes).  The federal government
can also set conditions on the expenditure of federal funds.  For example, states must
set 21 as the minimum age for the legal consumption of alcohol in order to qualify
for federal highway funds. 
Federal public health statutes are largely contained in the Public Health Service
Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Clean Air Act and other related statutes.  In general, the Public Health
Service Act authorizes the activities of the public health service agencies and creates
important vehicles for federal funding of public health activities in states and
communities.  The Federal Food,  Drug and Cosmetic Act authorizes the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to directly regulate the safety of food and cosmetics and
the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals, biologics, and medical devices.  The
National Environmental Policy Act and related environmental statutes authorize the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the safety of the air, water, and
the ecological system. 9
Other provisions of the federal code apply under emergency circumstances when
federal assistance to states and localities is needed.  The Stafford Act establishes
provisions for federal assistance to states in the event of a disaster.  The act requires
the governor of the affected state to request a declaration of a disaster and vests the
president with the authority to make such a declaration and charge federal agencies
to provide support to state and local efforts.
Federal Public Health Role and Organizations
A recently released report from the Institute of Medicine, The Future of Public
Health in the 21st Century, identifies six main areas where the federal government
plays a role in population health.  The six areas are policy making, financing, public
health protection,  collecting and disseminating information about U.S. health and
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health care delivery systems, capacity building for population health, and direct
management of services.10 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) bears primary
responsibility for most public health activities at the federal level.  Some key
activities are located in other departments such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Defense
(DoD), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  However, this paper will
focus on federal activities in HHS because it is the locus of funding to improve
public health capacity.
Department of Health and Human Services.  The newly formed Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness within the
Office of the Secretary (OS) directs and coordinates the implementation of HHS’s
bioterrorism programs and activities.  Other public health agencies within HHS with
responsibilities for bioterrorism preparedness and response include the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Administration (SAMSHA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  The CDC is the center of
federal public health activities.  The CDC works with states, localities, and other
nations to detect, investigate, and prevent the spread of disease, to develop and
implement prevention strategies, and to monitor the effect of environmental
conditions on health.  State and local public health agencies receive support from the
CDC in a variety of ways, including financial assistance, training programs, technical
assistance and expert consultation, sophisticated laboratory services, research
activities, and standards development.11  One of the key vehicles for support of state
and local public health agencies is the state and local preparedness grant program
established in 1999 and greatly expanded by the FY2002 supplemental.12  This
program provides funding and guidance to states to assist them in upgrading state and
local public health jurisdictions’ capacity to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism,
other outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health threats and
emergencies. 
Health Services and Resources Administration.  HRSA administers the
state grant program to facilitate regional hospital preparedness planning and to
upgrade the capacity of hospitals and other health care facilities to respond to public
health emergencies–including the development of multi-tiered systems which enable
local health care entities to triage, treat, stabilize and refer multiple casualties to
identified centers for treatment.  HRSA is also generally responsible for healthcare
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workforce development –including funding for training in emergency medical and
trauma services, as well as funding to improve medical school curricula in the area
of bioterrorism recognition.
Food and Drug Administration.  The FDA has responsibilities for ensuring
the availability of safe and effective drugs, vaccines, blood products, medical
devices, radiological products, and animal health products.  The FDA also has
responsibility for assuring the safety of the food supply and does so in partnership
with the Department of Agriculture which is responsible for the safety of meat,
poultry and processed egg products.  FDA establishes guidance and regulatory
requirements for assuring that food is not adulterated and ensures the safety and
efficacy of all drugs used in food animals and feeds.  The FDA is supported by 3000
state and local offices responsible for monitoring retail food establishments and their
employees. 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration.  SAMSHA is
responsible for improving the Nation’s health care capacity to provide prevention,
diagnosis, and treatment services for substance abuse and mental illnesses.
SAMSHA’s role in bioterrorism preparedness is to plan for the mental health
consequences of terrorist attacks and other major disasters. 
National Institutes of Health.  The NIH conducts and supports biomedical
research, including research targeted at the development of rapid diagnostics and new
and more effective vaccines and antimicrobial therapies.  Within NIH, the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) bears primary responsibility for
bioterrorism-related research.  The anthrax attacks of Fall 2001 uncovered unmet
needs for tests to rapidly diagnose, vaccines and immunotherapies to prevent, and
drugs and biologics to cure disease caused by agents of bioterrorism. In February
2002, NIAID announced its strategic research plan which is directed at supporting
research needed to understand the pathogenesis of the agents of bioterrorism and the
host response to them and to translate that knowledge into useful interventions and
effective diagnostic tools for an effective response.13 
Agency for Health Care Research and Quality.  AHRQ sponsors and
conducts research designed to improve the quality of health care.  In the area of
bioterrorism, AHRQ’s research focuses particularly on improving the clinical
preparedness of health care providers. For example, the agency has studied how best
to communicate with physicians and other private health care providers in the event
of a public health emergency and has assessed the most effective methods for training
physicians about bioterrorist threats. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The Homeland Security Act
(P.L. 107-296) leaves most public health activities in HHS.  The exceptions are the
Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
(renamed the Strategic National Stockpile) which are moved to the Emergency
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Preparedness and Response Directorate (EPR) of DHS.14  The EPR’s mission is to
improve the Nation’s capability to reduce losses from all disasters, including terrorist
attacks.15  In addition, P.L. 107-296 directs the Secretary of HHS to collaborate with
the Secretary of DHS in setting priorities for human-health related countermeasures
research and development and for all public-health related activities to improve state,
local and hospital preparedness and response.
Office of Emergency Preparedness.  OEP manages the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS) and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).
The NDMS was established to provide medical care and hospitalization in the event
a disaster overwhelms local emergency services.  It is a partnership of four federal
agencies (HHS, DoD, VA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)), state and local governments and the private sector.16  The primary focus
of the MMRS is to develop or enhance existing emergency preparedness systems in
metropolitan areas to manage effectively a large-scale public health emergency.  The
goal is to coordinate the efforts of local law enforcement, firefighters, hazardous
materials cleanup (HAZMAT) teams, EMS, hospital, public health and other
personnel to improve response capabilities such as early identification of specific
hazards, protection of the public from dangerous exposures, mass patient care and
fatality management, and environmental safety.  Enhanced metropolitan response
systems typically cost about $2.5 million and are jointly funded by HHS and local
governments, with funding primarily coming from local governments.  As of July,
2002, 122 cities were part of the MMRS.17
  Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  The SNS includes pharmaceuticals,
vaccines, and other medical supplies that can be deployed in the event of a
bioterrorist attack or any other public health emergency.  The stockpile has two
components:  (1) Push Packages, each consisting of 50 tons of preassembled medical
supplies, which can be delivered to any location in the country within 12 hours; and
(2) Vendor Managed Inventory packages, which are tailored to provide medical
supplies specific to a suspected or confirmed biological or chemical agent.18 
State Public Health Role and Organizations
States have primary responsibility for protecting the health and welfare of their
citizenry.  In general, all states have  public health statutes that provide public health
authorities with the power to collect data, license businesses, health care delivery
facilities, physicians and other providers, conduct inspections, and engage in
enforcement activities (including control of persons and property). However, states
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differ a great deal in size, population, risks, needs and capabilities and in how they
organize the provision of public health services.
Many states deliver public health services through multiple state agencies.
Thirty-five states have free-standing state health agencies, while in other states public
health is part of a larger agency that is responsible for a wide range of activities (for
example, human services).19  Important aspects of public health, such as
environmental health and emergency medical services (EMS), may be housed outside
the state’s primary public health agency.  In 36 states, the environmental health
agency is separate from the state health agency. Emergency medical services are
commonly  found in the public safety department or governed by a separate EMS
authority or board when they are not housed in the state public health agency.
States differ in the amount of authority they delegate to local governments.
Some states provide local governments with very little authority, while others offer
local jurisdictions “home rule” over public health matters.  Delegation of public
health authority can be classified into three categories: 1) a centralized approach in
which states have extensive legal and operational control over local authorities, 2)
a decentralized approach in which local governments are delegated significant
control, and 3) a hybrid approach in which some public health responsibilities are
provided directly by the state, while others are assumed by the localities.  Table 1
shows the distribution of states by category.
Table 1.  Distribution of States by Delegation of 
Public Health Authority to Localities
Centralized AR, DE*,FL, HI*, LA, MS, NM, RI*, SC, VA, VT*
Decentralized AZ, CO, CT, ID, IN, IA, ME, MO, MT, NE, NV, NJ,
ND, OR, UT. WA, WI
Hybrid AL, AK, CA, GA, IL, KA, KY, MD, MA, MI, MN, NH,
NC, NY, OH, OK, PA, SD, TN, TX, WV, WY
Source:  Salinsky NHPF Paper.
* State-run systems that do not classify their field offices as local health departments.
Both the location of public health activities within state government and the
extent of delegation to localities may be important factors in determining the speed
with which state and local public health are able to adapt to new priorities.  These
factors can have a large effect on the speed with which new guidance from the federal
government is incorporated into agency budgets and passed through to localities.  For
example, if a general state hiring freeze is in effect, the proximity of the state public
health officer to the state’s governor can make a big difference in how soon an
exemption for hiring specialized staff for bioterrorism preparedness gets considered.
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Figure 1.  LPHAs by Type of Jurisdiction
States also differ in how long they have focused on bioterrorism.  A number of
states received funding under CDC’s Bioterrorism Initiative beginning in 1999 for
a variety of different capacity building activities.  While state governments vary in
both the breadth and depth of services they cover and the degree to which they
delegate to local governments, they, nevertheless,  tend to play certain key roles in
public health emergency preparedness and response.  Except in the largest
metropolitan local public health departments, local public health officials will
generally turn to state personnel and capacity for  providing advanced laboratory
capacity and epidemiological expertise and serving as a conduit for federal
assistance.
Local Public Health Role and Organizations  
The role and organization of local public health varies tremendously across the
United States. However, in general local public health departments are in the front
line in responding to public health emergencies. The diversity in local public health
organizations (LPHAs) can be illustrated with a few statistics from a recent survey
of local public health infrastructure conducted  by the National Association of City
and County Health Officers (NACCHO).20 This variation may have important
implications for considering how best to improve public health preparedness.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of local public health agencies (LPHAs) by type
of jurisdiction.   The most common arrangement is a LPHA serving a single county,
but 40% of LPHAs serve other
types of jurisdictions.  County
LPHAS range in size from small
ru ra l  count ies  to  l a rge
metropolitan ones such as Los
Angeles County. County LPHAs
may or may not serve all
geographic areas within the
county–for example, a city within
a county may be served by its own
municipal LPHA.  City public
health agencies may serve small
cities or large urban areas such as
Kansas City, MO, or New York
City.  In some cases, a city and its
surrounding county join together
to form one city-county LPHA.
Township health departments are
usually located in states with
strong “home-rule” or “town-meeting” political systems such as Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  Finally, multi-county health departments serve more
than one county and often span large geographic areas in the western United States.
Multi-county LPHAs also include regional or district LPHAs whose health directors
may report to multiple county boards of health.
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Figure 2.  LPHAs by Population Served
Figure 2 shows the distribution of LPHAs by population served.  Over two-
thirds of LPHAs serve jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 people.  In contrast, 4%
of LPHAs serve jurisdictions with populations of 500,000 or more.  Not surprisingly,
the number of workers employed by LHPAs also varies tremendously. 
Table 2 shows both the
average and median number of
full-time equivalent (FTE)staff
f o r  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a n d
nonmetropolitan LPHAs.  The
average staff of a metropolitan
LPHA is 108 FTEs.  However,
half of metropolitan LPHAs have
28 or fewer FTEs.  In
nonmetropolitan areas, the
average number of FTEs is 31,
but half of the LPHAs have 13 or
fewer FTEs.  Administrative and
clerical staff, environmental
health specialists and public
health nurses are the occupational
categories most commonly used by LPHAs to describe the staff they employ.  The
training and education of workers in these positions varies tremendously and
occupational titles do not always reflect professional public health training or degrees
in a particular discipline.
Table 2.  Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Staff at LPHAs
Metro LPHAs Non-metro LPHAs
Mean FTEs 108 31
Median FTEs 28 13
Source:  NACCHO Chartbook.
The scope of services that LPHAs are responsible for also varies.  In some areas,
LPHAs run county hospitals, while in others, the LPHA is only responsible for septic
systems and restaurant inspections.  The most common bioterrorism-related programs
and services provided by LPHAs include epidemiology and surveillance,
communicable disease control measures, food safety, and restaurant inspections.  The
NACCHO survey shows that over 70% of LPHAs provide:  adult and child
immunizations, tuberculosis testing, community assessment, community outreach
and education, environmental health services, and health education. 
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Public Health Laboratories 
Public health laboratories are a special sub component of federal, state, and local
public health organizations.  Laboratories are a critical component of early detection.
Identification of a specific pathogen often requires specific testing protocols using
specific reagents and sometimes specialized equipment.  In addition, special safety
procedures (such as working under an exhaust hood) must be used with certain
pathogens–particularly those in aerosol form.  Most clinical laboratories are not set
up to identify the pathogens likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack.
CDC, in cooperation with the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the
FBI, has established a multi-level Laboratory Response Network (LRN) which
includes local, state and federal laboratories and facilitates sample collection,
transport, testing, planning for the capacity to handle a sudden large increase in
samples, and training for laboratory readiness to identify CDC-designated critical
biological agents.21 Currently, all 50 state public health laboratories are registered
members of the LRN.  Membership in the LRN gives laboratories access to standard
protocols for testing and for sample preparation and care that preserves the chain of
custody and maintains a sample’s viability for later testing. 
Clinical and public health laboratories in the LRN are identified by increasing
levels of sophistication.  A lab’s designation depends on the biosafety level of its
physical facilities and its ability to perform certain types of tests.22  Originally, the
LRN categorized labs as Level A, B, C, or D with Level D labs representing the
highest biosafety level and proficiency.  As the LRN has matured, this categorization
has been revised to more closely reflect a lab’s function within the LRN.  Sentinel
labs are on the front line and can perform tests to rule out suspected biologic agents.
If a sentinel lab is unable to rule out a suspected agent, the sample is referred to a
confirmatory lab which can perform more sophisticated tests.  Finally, national labs
perform definitive characterization of an agent once it has been identified by a
confirmatory lab.
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Public Health Workforce 
Recent attempts to enumerate the public health workforce yield estimates of
roughly 450,000 employed workers deployed approximately evenly at the local, state,
and national levels.23  The public health workforce encompasses a wide range of
professional disciplines and occupations.  Some of the most common are physicians,
nurses, environmental specialists, laboratorians, health educators, disease
investigators, outreach workers and managers.  Professional public health training
includes studies in biologic sciences, epidemiology, biostatistics, environmental
health science, and health services administration.  Estimates from a 1989 HRSA
study show that only 44% of public health workers had formal, academic training in
public health.24  As of 1997, 78% of local health department executives did not have
graduate degrees in public health.25  
Data and Information Systems  
Data and information systems are important components of the public health
infrastructure because of the need to manage and analyze large amounts of
information and the need to communicate quickly and accurately with a wide range
of other entities.  Data and information systems encompass disease surveillance
systems, epidemiological analysis and communication systems.   These systems are
currently a  hodgepodge of paper, telephone and computer-based systems.  For
example, only half of state, local and territorial health departments had full internet
connectivity on October 4, 2001, when the first anthrax case was reported.  Another
20% lacked e-mail capacity and so were unable to receive electronic updates
regarding the anthrax events.26 
CDC, along with partners from the state and local public health community,
have initiated several programs to implement recommendations from the National
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics and others to move toward a National
Health Information Infrastructure.27  These programs are described briefly below.
Health Alert Network (HAN).  The Health Alert Network (HAN) is a
nationwide, integrated information and communications system serving as a platform
for distribution of health alerts, dissemination of prevention guidelines and other
information, distance learning, national disease surveillance, and electronic
laboratory reporting.  The HAN program is managed by CDC and is also designed
to provide resources for building information technology capacity within local public
health departments.  Currently, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, eight
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territories, two-thirds of U.S. counties and major hospital networks and health
organizations are connected to HAN.  The information technology capacity
improvements generated through the HAN program allow states and localities to
improve communication with CDC and each other for a range of activities.  
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).  The goal
of NEDSS is to have integrated surveillance systems that can transfer appropriate
public health, laboratory, and clinical data efficiently and securely over the internet.28
To accomplish this goal, NEDSS promotes the use of data and information standards
which are necessary for the development of efficient, integrated and interoperable
surveillance systems at federal, state and local levels.29   
Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X).  The Epi-X system allows
secure, Web-based communications among federal, state and local epidemiologists,
laboratories and other members of the public health community.  It also provides the
capacity for instant notification about urgent public health events and a searchable
database with information on outbreaks and unusual health events.30
Funding
Funding for public health comes from a variety of sources including local, state
and federal government programs, grants from foundations, reimbursements from
insurance companies, and patient and regulatory fees.  As noted above, huge
differences exist in the scope of activities, size of population served and organization
of the governmental public health infrastructure at the state and local levels.
Differences in defining public health activities and in accounting practices make it
difficult to gather systematic and comparable national information on public health
expenditures from all sources.  One specific difficulty involves counting all
expenditures related to a common set of public health activities (for example,
environmental health) regardless of where they are in the governmental structure.
Another particularly difficult problem is separating expenditures and receipts for
direct medical care services to individuals from those for general population-based
services.     
Given the difficulty of measuring public health expenditures, it is not surprising
that estimates from different sources yield different results.  Recently published
estimates based on National Health Account (NHA) data show total federal, state and
local public health expenditures of $17.1 billion for 2000.31  Federal spending
accounted for 28% of the total with state and local spending making up the remaining
72%.  In these estimates, NHA data were adjusted in an attempt to include only
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funding for population-based services.  In contrast, estimates from a state-sponsored
survey of nine states done in the early 1990's showed that 50% of spending for
population-based public health activities came from states, while 32% came from
federal sources and 18% came from local sources.32  
A separate analysis of local health agency funding sources shows that, on
average, 44% of LPHA funding came from local sources while 30% came from state
sources including pass-throughs of federal funding.  An additional 3% of funding
came directly from the federal government to LPHAs and 19% came from fees or
service reimbursement.33  Metropolitan LPHAs tend to receive a larger share of
funding from local sources than non-metropolitan LPHAs. 
HHS has provided support to a collaborative effort among state and local public
health associations to explore methods to measure actual public health expenditures
at the state and local level.  Initial feasibility studies show some promise, but no
systematic accounting is currently conducted on a regular basis.34  
Public Health Partners
Many entities beyond the governmental public health infrastructure play
important roles in protecting the public’s health.  Physicians and other clinical care
practitioners and hospitals are two key partners.  During routine times, private-sector
physicians and other providers can support the public health system by reporting
occurrences of certain diseases, by implementing public health recommendations for
preventive treatment and patient education and by participating in emergency
planning exercises.  In a public health emergency, much of any needed medical
treatment will be provided by private-sector physicians and other providers subject
to the overall coordination of public health officials.  Hospitals have disease
reporting and public education responsibilities and also provide emergency medical




Recent congressional action has provided a framework for strengthening the
public health infrastructure at the federal, state and local level and has provided
funding for those activities.  Table 3 shows federal bioterrorism funding for FY2002,
FY2003 and proposed levels for FY2004.









Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC)
State and local public health preparedness 940 1,039a 940
CDC capacity 141 157 158
Anthrax Vaccine Research 18 18 18
CDC Physical Security and Facilities 46 20 0
Independent Studies 2 2 0
Subtotal, CDC $1,148 $1,236 $1,116
Health Resources and Services Admin.
(HRSA)
Hospital preparedness and infrastructure 135 515 518
Medical Curriculum Incentives 0 28 60
Smallpox Compensation Program b 0 42 0
Subtotal, HRSA $135 $585 $578
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Food safety 98 97 116
Vaccine and drug approval 46 54 53
Physical security 13 7 7
Subtotal, FDA $157 $158 $176
National Institutes of Health
Researchc 199 NA 1,625
Anthrax vaccine procurementc 0 NA 0
Intramural physical security and facilities 92 521 0









Subtotal, NIHc $291 NA $1,625
Office of the Secretary (OS)
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness 49 42 42
Otherd 8 20 20
Subtotal, OS $57 $62 $62
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 0 5 0
Total, HHS Bioterrorisme $1,788 NA $3,557
Transfers to Homeland Securityf
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 645 300 0
Smallpox vaccine procurement 512 100 0
Office of Emergency Response 72 101 0
Overhead 3 3 0
Subtotal, Transfers to Homeland Security $1,232 $504 0
Source:  Dept. of HHS, Office of Budget, Technology, and Finance, May 14, 2003.
Note:  Columns may not add due to rounding.
a Includes $100 million for the smallpox vaccination program from the FY2003 supplemental.
b Funding for the Smallpox Compensation Program was included in the FY2003 supplemental.
c HHS is not able to provide a detailed breakdown of NIH bioterrorism funding at this time.
d Includes funds for cybersecurity and medical reserve corps.
e A total for HHS bioterrorism funding in FY2003 is not available at this time because funding for
NIH is not available.
f Amounts shown for 2002 funded programs within HHS.
HHS launched its bioterrorism initiative in FY1999.  The initiative has six
strategic goals:  prevention of bioterrorism, infectious disease surveillance, medical
and public health readiness for mass casualty events, the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS), research and development of new drugs and vaccines, and
information technology infrastructure.  Funding for these activities in the first 3 years
(FY1999-FY2001) totaled $730 million.  CDC used most of those funds to begin the
process of improving the bioterrorism preparedness and response capacity of state
and local health departments.
P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act, passed in June, 2002 and provides a 5-year authorization for activities
designed to bolster the nation’s ability to respond effectively to bioterrorist threats
and other public health emergencies.  The Act authorizes a total of $2.4 billion in
FY2002, $2.0 billion for FY2003 and such sums as may be necessary for the
CRS-17
35 For a complete summary of P.L. 107-188, see CRS Report RL31263, Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L. 107-188):  Provisions and
Changes to Preexisting Law, by C. Stephen Redhead and Mary Tiemann.
36 The $3 billion for HHS includes $1,788 million for programs retained by HHS and $1,232
million for programs that were transferred to DHS during FY2003.
37 Final NIH funding levels for bioterrorism are not yet available from HHS for 2003, but
are expected to reflect an increase of approximately the magnitude requested in the
President’s FY2003 budget.
remaining years.  The Act establishes specific statutory authorities for many of the
bioterrorism-related activities already underway under the broader authorities granted
in P.L. 106-505, the Public Health Improvement Act.  In addition, P.L. 107-188
requires the Secretary of HHS to register facilities and individuals in possession of
biological agents and toxins that pose a severe threat to public health and safety, and
to promulgate new safety and security requirements for such facilities and
individuals.
P.L. 107-188 also contains several provisions to protect the nation’s food and
drug supply and enhance agricultural security.  It authorizes funds for USDA and
FDA to hire new border inspectors, develop new methods of detecting contaminated
foods, work with state food safety regulators, and protect crops and livestock.  It also
enhances FDA’s ability to inspect and detain suspicious imported food.  Finally, it
authorizes the provision of financial assistance to community water systems to
conduct vulnerability assessments and prepare response plans.35 
HHS bioterrorism funding was increased from its original FY2002 enacted level
of $243 million by the emergency supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 107-38)
passed within days of the September 11 attacks and in an amendment to the FY2002
Defense Department appropriations bill (P.L. 107-117).  In total, bioterrorism
funding for HHS for FY2002 was $3.0 billion.36  Funding was provided under several
broad categories, including $645 million for the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
(NPS), $512 million to purchase smallpox vaccine, $940 million to improve state and
local public health capacity, $135 million to upgrade hospital capacity, $141 million
to upgrade CDC’s facilities and capacity, $291 for NIH research and lab construction,
and $157 for FDA lab security, vaccine approval, and food safety.
Funding for HHS bioterrorism activities for FY2003 comes from the
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) passed in February, 2003 and
the FY2003 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) passed in April, 2003.  The
regular 2003 appropriation generally maintained programs at levels similar to the
prior year.  The largest increases are for HRSA’s hospital preparedness grant program
and for NIH research funding.37
The President’s FY2004 budget requests a total of $3.6 billion for HHS’s
bioterrorism preparedness programs and activities.  The budget request includes
funds for upgrading CDC’s facilities, improving state and local public health and
hospital preparedness, medical research, developing vaccines, expanding FDA’s
regulatory oversight of drugs and biologics, and securing facilities to conduct critical
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scientific work.  Most of the increase is concentrated in NIH and HRSA while other
HHS bioterrorism funding is approximately maintained at FY2002 levels.
Strengthening Public Health Infrastructure
This section will discuss key aspects of  the Nation’s public health infrastructure
targeted for funding by the Congress, the capacity improvements they are intended
to produce, and the challenges to making needed improvements.
State and Local Preparedness
The largest single increase in funding for bioterrorism-related activities in
FY2002 is the state and local capacity building grant program managed by CDC.
Funding for capacity improvements was allocated to states, territories and several
major metropolitan areas largely on the basis of population for FY2002 and FY2003.
The funding is directed at improving capacity in six focus areas:  preparedness
planning and readiness assessment, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory
capacity for biologic agents, Health Alert Network/communications and information
technology, risk communication and health information dissemination, and education
and training.
Guidance from CDC established critical capacities within each focus area.  The
capacities are the core expertise and infrastructure needed to enable a public health
system to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism, other infectious disease outbreaks,
and other public health threats.  States were required in their grant applications to
provide (for each critical capacity) a brief description of the existing capacity in their
jurisdiction, an assessment of whether this capacity is adequate, and proposals for
improving inadequate capacity during the 2002 budget cycle.  States were also given
the option of requesting support for enhanced capacities in areas where they have
already achieved critical capacity.  State grant applications were due April 15, 2002
and most of the applications were approved in June, 2002.  Table 4 shows the initial
distribution of funding across focus areas and  the critical capacities for each focus
area.38
CRS-19






A.  Preparedness planning and readiness assessment $280 31%
Critical capacity:
 – to establish a process for strategic leadership, direction,
coordination, and assessment of activities to ensure state and local
readiness, interagency collaboration, and preparedness;
 – to conduct integrated assessments of public health system capacities
related to bioterrorism;
 – to develop and exercise a comprehensive public health emergency
preparedness and response plan;
 – to ensure that state, local, and regional preparedness and response
are effectively coordinated with federal response assets;
 – to effectively manage the CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile,
should it be deployed.
B.  Surveillance and epidemiology $201 22%
Critical capacity:
 – to rapidly detect a terrorist event through a highly functioning,
mandatory reportable disease surveillance system, as evidenced by
ongoing, timely and complete reporting by providers and laboratories
in a jurisdiction;
 – to rapidly and effectively investigate and respond to a potential
terrorist event as evidenced by a comprehensive and exercised
epidemiologic response plan that addresses surge capacity, delivery of
mass prophylaxis and immunizations and as evidenced by ongoing
effective state and local response to naturally occurring individual
cases of urgent public health importance, outbreaks of disease and
emergency public health interventions.
C.  Laboratory capacity –biologic agents $147 16%
Critical capacity:
  – to develop and implement a jurisdiction-wide program to provide
rapid and effective laboratory services to support response;
 – to ensure adequate and secure laboratory facilities, reagents, and
equipment to rapidly detect and correctly identify biological agents
likely to be used in a bioterrorist incident.
E.  Health alert network/communications and information technology $149 16%
Critical capacity:
 – to ensure effective communications connectivity among public health
departments, healthcare organizations, law enforcement organizations,
public officials, and others;
 – to ensure a method of emergency communication for participants in
public health emergency response that is fully redundant with e-mail in
case the Internet is disabled by a catastrophic event;
 – to ensure ongoing protection of critical data and information
systems;
 – to ensure secure electronic exchange of clinical, laboratory,
environmental, and other public health information in standard formats
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F.  Risk communication and health information dissemination $41 4%
Critical capacity:
 – establish critical baseline information about the current
communication needs and barriers within individual communities and
identify effective channels of communication for reaching the general
public and special populations during public health threats and
emergencies in order to provide needed health/risk information to the
public and key partners during a terrorism event.
G.  Education and training $97 11%
Critical capacity:
 – to ensure the delivery of appropriate education and training to key
public health professionals, infectious disease specialists, emergency
department personnel, and other healthcare providers in preparedness
for and response to bioterrorism, other infectious disease outbreaks,
and other public health threats and emergencies.
Source:  CDC Planning Guidance.
a Projected amounts based on initial state plan submissions, Aug. 2, 2002. 
Guidance for state and local capacity building for FY 2003 was released on May
2, 2003 and responses from grantees are due July 1, 2003.39  The FY2003 guidance
follows the same general framework as the FY2002 guidance, but has some
differences that reflect both the natural progression in an ongoing program and
experience gained over the past year.  The main differences include:  the addition of
funding availability for increasing laboratory capacity for chemical agents; more
specific guidance on smallpox preparedness activities; and  explicit recommendations
and requirements that planning activities address mental health needs associated with
terrorist attacks.  The FY2003 guidance also requires that states document that a
significant portion of local public health officials concur with the proposed use of
funds.
Hospital Preparedness
In addition to the CDC grants for state and local preparedness, additional funds
have been directed to states, territories and three major metropolitan areas through
HRSA to improve hospital preparedness.  For FY2002, $135 million was
appropriated and the FY2003 appropriation increased funding to $515 million.  The
grants are for the development and implementation of regional plans to improve the
capacity of hospitals, their emergency departments, outpatient centers, EMS systems,
and other collaborating entities for responding to incidents requiring mass
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immunization, treatment, isolation and quarantine in the aftermath of bioterrorism
or other outbreaks of infectious disease.40 
States had to achieve three critical benchmarks in order to receive their full
allotments for hospital preparedness in FY2002:  (1) designate a coordinator for
bioterrorism hospital preparedness planning, (2) establish a hospital preparedness
planning committee including representation from a broad range of medical and
emergency management partners, and (3) devise a plan for responding to a potential
epidemic in each state or region.  States also must develop a needs assessment for
hospitals and EMS systems and an implementation plan that addresses those needs.
The HRSA guidance for FY2002 identified four priority issues for states to
consider in developing their plans.  These priority areas include: (1) developing
contingency plans for antibiotic and vaccine treatment of biological exposures; (2)
planning for personal protective equipment to protect health care workers and
patients, portable or fixed decontamination systems, or capital improvements
designed to increase capacity for quarantine and treatment of biological casualties;
(3) assessing existing local and state communications capabilities available to
hospitals and collaborating entities, and the ability  to respond to overloading of
standard telephone, cellular phone and radio communications during a bioterrorist
incident resulting in mass casualties; and (4) planning community-wide biological
disaster drills of sufficient intensity to impact the community’s normal operations
during the exercise and to test bioterrorism disaster plans.
The FY2003 HRSA guidance was announced May 2, 2003 is more extensive
than the FY2002 guidance, reflecting both the increased funding levels for 2003 and
experience gained over the past year.  The 2003 guidance sets sixteen critical
benchmarks across six priority areas.  The priority areas are: administration, regional
surge capacity, emergency medical services, linkages to public health departments,
education and preparedness training, and terrorism preparedness activities.  The
guidance also emphasizes HRSA’s intent that most of the funding awarded to state
health departments must be allocated to hospitals, emergency medical systems, and
other health care entities.
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS)  
The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (renamed the Strategic National
Stockpile by the Homeland Security Act) was created to ensure the availability of the
life-saving pharmaceuticals, antidotes and other medical supplies and equipment
necessary to counter the effects of nerve agents, biological pathogens and chemical
agents.  The NPS is meant to augment state and local resources during an attack or
other emergency.  Funds allocated to the NPS are used to purchase, store and rotate
supplies, to assist states and localities in developing plans for deployment and for
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providing training  and simulation exercises for state and local officials in the use and
distribution of deployed resources.41
Research
Research to develop new drugs and vaccines, increase understanding of how
organisms cause disease, how the immune system responds to disease, improve
diagnostics for human samples, and to improve environmental detection capability
is  also an important component of preparing for a bioterrorist attack.  Research
activities related to bioterrorism are spread throughout the federal government and
occur at the state and local level as well.  Within HHS, the main entities conducting
bioterrorism-related research are NIH, CDC, and FDA.  Within NIH, much of the
bioterrorism-related research is housed in the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID).  The NIAID has recently published a strategic plan that
sets priorities for counter-terrorism research.  The strategic plan lists six areas of
research emphasis including the biology of the microbe, host response, vaccines,
therapeutics, diagnostics and research infrastructure improvements.  At the CDC,
research efforts are directed toward supporting public health infrastructure capacity
improvements.  FDA bears responsibility for food safety and for regulating the safety
and efficacy of new vaccines, antibiotics, other countermeasures and diagnostic
devices.  FDA’s research activities provide the scientific basis for their regulatory
decisions and the tools needed to identify and assess risks.
Challenges to Improving 
Public Health Infrastructure
While recent Congressional action has provided significant funding increases
for bioterrorism preparedness and response, challenges to achieving improvements
remain in several areas.  As Congress assesses the effectiveness of initial funding
increases and considers future funding levels, information about how these
challenges are being addressed by different components of the public health system
may be of interest.  These are discussed below.
Defining Preparedness
Bioterrorism is not one threat, but a broad range of threats encompassing
multiple different pathogens, multiple paths for transmission in many potential
locations.  The broad nature of these threats require breadth and depth of
preparedness across many jurisdictions.  One challenge in increasing preparedness
is establishing what minimum level of capacity must exist in every locality and what
capacity can be created on a more consolidated basis at a state, regional or federal
level.
While a number of assessment tools have been developed to assist states and
localities in defining their needs, there are no systemwide standards for public health
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preparedness at the local, state or federal level.  This makes measuring progress and
defining base funding needs difficult.
Coordination and Communication 
The many parties involved in preparing for and responding to a bioterrorist
attack generate an almost overwhelming coordination and communication challenge.
In addition to sheer numbers, the need to coordinate activities and plans among
groups who previously had limited, if any interaction with each other poses a
significant challenge.  At the most basic level, all parties involved in responding to
a public health emergency must be able to communicate easily with each other.
Development of compatible or interoperable communications for use by all
responders has been proposed by many, but developing standards for
communications equipment across users with differing needs may be problematic.
Emergency Management.  Standards for emergency response call for clear
lines of authority and clarity with regard to all participants’ roles and responsibilities.
However, a recent study by the GAO documents the fragmentation of responsibilities
across federal agencies.42  In addition, some have expressed concern over
coordination of federal and state authorities and responsibilities, particularly as they
relate to quarantine decisions and restrictions on travel and transportation across state
borders.  Similar issues can arise between states, especially where major metropolitan
areas cross state boundaries.  Coordination between states and localities can also be
problematic, especially in major metropolitan areas with strong local public health
infrastructure.43  Coordination and communication between public health officials
and private-sector health care providers is also a major concern.  The recent anthrax
attack established that public health officials’ ability to communicate quickly and
effectively with private-sector physicians is severely limited.
Medical Care vs. Public Health Providers.  One of the challenges in this
area is the need to bridge the gap between public health practice and medical practice
that developed during the 20th century.  As biomedical advances greatly increased
physicians’ ability to treat disease, medicine and public health developed as distinct
professional fields with very different cultures and limited understanding and
acceptance of each other’s approach to protecting public health.  This gap creates
challenges in improving public health preparedness because of physicians’
uneasiness about depending on public health professionals for medical treatment
protocols.
Communication between public health officials and hospitals is problematic for
similar reasons.  In addition, the competitive nature of the hospital component of the
health care delivery system makes cooperation among hospitals to pool resources and
develop emergency response plans problematic.  For example, one task hospitals
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undertake to plan for surge capacity in a public health emergency is to develop lists
of where they can get additional supplies such as linens.  If hospitals do not share this
information with each other, then it would be possible for multiple hospitals to be
depending on the same supplier for excess supply in an emergency.  On the other
hand,  hospitals prefer not to share information about suppliers with their competitors
because it can put them at a competitive disadvantage.
Food Safety.  Concerns also remain about the effectiveness of the current
fragmented food safety system in preventing introduction of food-borne pathogens.
Specific concerns include the division of responsibility between FDA and USDA,
inadequate inspection and enforcement resources (especially in FDA), and the
inability to order food recalls (the current system depends on manufacturers to do so
on a voluntary basis).44
Public Information.  Clear and credible communication with the public is
believed to be essential for minimizing panic and providing necessary substantive
information.  Experts have noted that public health agencies does not have adequate
plans, resources, or trained personnel to properly communicate risks and
recommendations to the public during health emergencies.
Information Systems  
Inadequate information and telecommunications capacities have been cited as
major weaknesses in the current public health infrastructure.  Improvements in this
area could help meet many of the communication challenges cited above.  As
described previously, CDC has established the Health Alert Network (HAN) to
enhance state and local computer and information technology capacity.  The ultimate
goal of this program includes an Internet backbone, hardware, secure Web sites,
curriculum, distance learning, and media programs.  However, some worry that the
basic needs in some states and localities are so great that much of the initial
investment will be needed just to purchase the necessary computer equipment.
Experts have also called for development of widely accepted data standards and
expanded use of electronic, Web-based disease reporting from physicians and
laboratories to improve reporting compliance and timeliness.45
Laboratory Capacity  
The anthrax attacks highlighted the need to improve public health laboratory
capacity and technological capabilities.  Experts have called for accelerated
development and dissemination of rapid diagnostic and detection tests.  Concerns
have also been raised about physical security at laboratory facilities that store and
process hazardous microbes and chemicals.
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Research
While government funding for research on countermeasures to bioagents has
increased, concerns exist about the likelihood of significant investment by the
pharmaceutical industry in the development of antibiotics and vaccines.  The
commercial market for these products and other countermeasures has been viewed
as modest and concerns over liability have further reduced industry interest.
Emergency Medical Preparedness and Response  
In addition to the coordination and communication challenges cited above,
concern has been raised over the significant resource needs of  health care facilities
to respond to bioterrorism relative to the amount of funding committed for these
purposes thus far.  Some have suggested that it may be possible to reduce the
resources required by pooling resources across regions and making strategic
investment decisions.
Public Health Workforce 
In order to provide the public health services necessary for responding to the
bioterrorist threat, the public health system must have an adequate supply of people
with the skills and training needed to perform certain key functions.  Among these
functions are:  forming effective partnerships with other parts of the response
community to develop and implement public health preparedness plans, detecting
disease outbreaks through surveillance, epidemiology and laboratory testing, and
communicating health risks and preventive measures to the public, health care
providers, and key decision makers.
 Even before last fall’s anthrax attacks, the gap between the skills and education
needed to provide public health services and those that exist in the current public
health workforce  were of concern to many in the public health community.  Salaries
are generally low for people working in public health which has made it hard to
attract and retain an adequate workforce.  The average tenure of a state health
department chief executive is 2 years.46
Workforce development issues encompass both concerns about the availability
of enough skilled workers to fill the current needs of public health departments, the
adequacy of the supply in the educational pipeline, the adequacy of public health and
medical curricula and the ability to train current workers to provide needed skills.47
In addition, state and local health departments have expressed concern over hiring
additional personnel without assurance of stable funding.  Specific concerns include
worries about  ensuring adequate surge capacity for medical response, the ability to
attain adequate epidemiological staff to investigate disease outbreaks, and assuring
an adequate supply of trained laboratory personnel.
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Inadequate supply of a skilled laboratory workforce is of particular concern in
the context of bioterrorism.  A recent survey48 of state public health laboratory
capacity showed that states may have only one person trained appropriately to
perform bioterrorism testing.  Among the states and territories participating in the
survey, a total of 76 more PhD- level molecular scientists were needed than were
available.  Because other opportunities attract the limited number of experts, it is
doubtful that these positions can be filled readily.  About half of respondents stated
that they had no full-time information technology staff dedicated to developing and
maintaining laboratory information systems.  In addition, two-thirds of survey
respondents noted the need to hire additional staff to handle managerial, clerical,
information, communications, training and worker safety activities.
In addition to problems with hiring and retaining adequately trained workers,
public health agencies have had trouble training workers as new challenges arise.
Barriers to training include rural isolation for many local public health workers,
travel limitations, inadequately coordinated training efforts, overworked staff unable
to leave work for professional development, and lack of funding for training.
Finally, many worry about how to be sure that the increased funding devoted to
increasing public health capacity yields results in improved preparedness and
response capability.
Conclusion
The events of fall, 2001 have heightened concern about the nation’s ability to
respond to bioterrorist attacks.  The strength of the public health infrastructure at the
federal, state, and local level is an important determinant of the speed and
effectiveness with which a response occurs and, therefore, of the severity of the
consequences in terms of number of people affected.  Recent Congressional action
has provided funding and guidance to improve public health capacity at the federal,
state, and local level.  As Congress grapples with future funding decisions, continued
interest in how public health agencies are using increased funding to improve
capacity is expected.
